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Abstract: The authors’ first-hand experiences with post-earthquake building safety evaluation and related 
activities after the 2015 Nepal (Gorkha) earthquake are presented. Following the earthquake, Applied Technology 
Council’s ATC 20 Guideline or its derivatives were used for Rapid Evaluation of buildings in the earthquake-
affected areas of Nepal. Various organisations and consulting companies provided their services on a volunteer 
and commercial basis for the evaluation efforts. These efforts provided an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the processes and the issues that arose during the work. Lessons learned from these experiences regarding the 
effectiveness of Rapid Evaluation of damaged buildings, placarding, and training needs are discussed herein. 
Improvements to current building safety (usability) evaluation were proposed and an outline of further 
considerations for reoccupation of damaged buildings in Nepal is presented.  
1 Introduction 
The Mw 7.8 2015 Gorkha earthquake occurred at 11:56 Nepal Standard Time (NST) on 25 April 2015 with a focal 
depth of approximately 15 km. The epicentre was near Barpak Village in Gorkha District, which is located 77 
kilometres (48 miles) northwest of the capital city of Kathmandu (Figure 1). The earthquake was followed by 484 
aftershocks. The most significant aftershock occurred 17 days after the first earthquake at 12:50 NST on 12 May 
2015 and was Mw 7.3 with a focal depth of 18.5 km and an epicentre located northeast of Kathmandu (NSC, 
2015). The aftershocks added substantially to the structural damage and number of casualties. Of the 75 
administrative districts of Nepal, the earthquake sequence affected 31 districts in the Western and Central regions, 
with 14 of the 31 districts severely affected in terms of casualties, infrastructural losses, and damage to lifeline 
facilities such as hospitals, communications and water supply facilities. The earthquake sequence affected an area 
of approximately 30,000 square kilometres, resulting in roughly 9,000 deaths and 23,000 injuries. Overall, the 
earthquake damaged or destroyed approximately 850,000 houses, 6,000 buildings, and 30,000 classrooms (NRA, 
2016).  
 
The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) made available a set of ground motions from a recording station in 
Kathmandu for the 25 April 2015 earthquake. The data include displacement, velocity, and acceleration time 
histories recorded at the station along three directions. The N-S direction was the dominant shaking direction 
(although a comparable level of shaking took place in the E-W direction). The recorded peak ground displacement 
(PGD) and peak ground acceleration (PGA) were approximately 1.4 m and 0.16 g, respectively.  
 
Due to the extensive fatalities, injuries, damage and destruction, the 2015 earthquake sequence was by far the 
most devastating earthquake in Nepal since the Great Nepal earthquake in 1934 (Rana & Lall, 2013). Most of the 
earthquake-affected areas are not accessible by all-weather roads or any form of land transport. The most common 
building typologies in the earthquake-affected areas are loadbearing unreinforced masonry buildings and cast-in-
situ reinforced concrete (RC) frame buildings with unreinforced masonry infill. Loadbearing buildings are 
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constructed of rubble stone or fired or unfired brick with mud mortar and timber floor and roof structures. RC 
frame buildings are more common in urban areas and along transport corridors. More than 70% of the buildings 
that suffered damage or destruction were loadbearing masonry buildings (Bothara, Dhakal, Dizhur, & Ingham, 
2016).    
 
 
Figure 1: Location of the 2015 Nepal Earthquake Sequence (adapted from Google Map) 
Following the earthquakes, in addition to addressing societal, psychological, and economic issues affecting people 
and communities, one of the most critical needs was triaging buildings to identify which were occupiable and 
which posed potential threats. For triage, it was necessary to inspect buildings quickly, efficiently, and safely. For 
the triage process, Rapid Evaluation of the buildings was conducted following the “Seismic Vulnerability 
Evaluation Guideline for Private and Public Buildings, Part II: Post Disaster Damage Assessment” (Guideline) 
(DUDBC, 2009), prepared by the Department of Urban Development and Building Construction (DUDBC), 
which is a Government of Nepal (GoN) enterprise. The Guideline is based on “Procedures for Post-Earthquake 
Safety Evaluation of Buildings” (ATC, 1989) and follows a traffic light system (i.e., green, yellow, or red) to 
define a building’s safety level. However, the Guideline is limited to concrete and loadbearing masonry buildings 
(mainly brick buildings), while the large majority of damaged buildings in the earthquake-affected areas were 
constructed of rubble stone or adobe with mud mortar. In addition, the Applied Technology Council prepared a 
post-earthquake building safety evaluation guideline document for Bhutan in 2014 (ATC, 2014).  This document 
provides guidance on post-earthquake building safety evaluation of Bhutanese building typologies, which are 
similar to Nepalese building typologies. Accordingly, this document would have been suitable for assessment in 
Nepal. However, engineers in Nepal were either unaware of this document or, if they were aware of it, could not 
afford its purchase.  
Rapid Evaluation was conducted for buildings of all types of occupancy in urban areas, whereas in rural areas, 
these evaluations were limited to institutional buildings. The evaluation process was partly voluntary in nature, 
and placarding of assessed buildings was generally not practiced. The GoN conducted a separate survey in mainly 
rural earthquake-affected areas, with the objective of reconstruction planning. This survey classified buildings 
into three groups: i) collapsed, ii) semi-damaged, or iii) not damaged (or limited damage).  
The earthquake sequence presented a unique opportunity to study the Rapid Evaluation process followed in Nepal 
and further refine the procedures for use in future earthquakes. The authors of this paper were involved in Rapid 
Evaluation, delivery of training on Rapid Evaluation, or other post-earthquake response activities. The authors’ 
first-hand experiences with Rapid Evaluation and related activities undertaken after the 2015 Nepal (aka Gorkha) 
earthquake is presented. 
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2 Building Safety Evaluation Procedure 
Post-earthquake safety evaluation of buildings in Nepal was largely based on the Applied Technology Council’s 
ATC 20 procedure (ATC, 1989). The procedure is described in the guideline document published by Nepal’s 
DUDBC (DUDBC, 2009), which suggests Windshield Evaluation to scope overall damage. In addition to 
Windshield Evaluation, the Guideline suggests a three-stage damage evaluation process comprising: i) Rapid 
Evaluation, ii) Detailed Evaluation, and iii) Detailed Quantitative Analysis (Figure 2). However, the guideline 
provides methodologies for Rapid Evaluation and Detailed Evaluation only. It does not provide objective and 
procedure for Detailed Quantitative Analysis. The methods prescribed in the Guideline for Rapid Evaluation are 
similar to those prescribed by ATC 20. However, the Detailed Evaluation method prescribed in the Guideline is 
much more extensive than that prescribed by ATC 20. The Guideline suggests that calculations and drawings be 
reviewed, non-destructive testing (NDT) be performed, and observed displacement be matched with a building’s 
seismic capacity curve. Based on the description of the Detailed Evaluation provided in the Guideline, this process 
closely approximates the Detailed Quantitative Analysis. Per the Guideline, the purpose of the Detailed Evaluation 
is to assist the appraisal of compensation to households, the planning of reconstruction activity, and assessing 
the level of intervention required for repair and retrofitting. 
 
Figure 2: Post-earthquake Building Safety Evaluation Framework (DUDBC, 2009)  
The Guideline proposes placarding of buildings based on a traffic light system, with evaluation results used to 
determine the state of buildings as Inspected (green placard), Restricted Use (yellow placard), or Unsafe (red 
placard), as shown in Figure 3. To facilitate the triage process, the Guideline provides an evaluation framework 
and forms (Figure 4) for Rapid Evaluation and Detailed Evaluation to be completed on-site for each building. The 
evaluation framework is provided for RC frame and load bearing masonry (brick and stone) buildings only.  
As previously mentioned, the GoN conducted a separate survey to determine the inventory of collapsed, semi-
damaged, and undamaged buildings for reconstruction planning purposes. In addition, some institutions developed 
their own methodology and forms for Rapid Evaluation and damage assessment of buildings (Pradhan, Adhikari, 
& Bhat, 2015). 
   
Figure 3: Traffic Light System for Placarding Buildings (DUDBC, 2009)  
The objective of Rapid Evaluation is to quickly inspect and evaluate buildings in earthquake-affected areas with 
the minimum manpower generally available at the time of an emergency. Rapid Evaluation typically includes 
only an exterior evaluation of structures and can be carried out by building inspectors, architects, or properly 
trained personnel, who are not required to be structural engineers. The Guideline also suggests inspection of 
building interiors if it is safe to do so. The Guideline recommends demolition of a building if it is deemed Unsafe 
(red placard) (Figure 3) although the goal of Rapid Evaluation should be to determine the appropriate placard for 
a building, rather than to make a decision regarding its demolition.  
 
Figure 4: Rapid Evaluation Safety Assessment Form (DUDBC, 2009) 
The Guideline suggests that the Detailed Evaluation process be performed for all buildings, whether they are 
issued a green, yellow, or red placard. This process includes an in-depth investigation of a building, including 
detailed damage mapping and NDT. The Guideline further discusses the matching of theoretical capacity curves 
and earthquake-induced displacement of a building, as well as adjustment of the theoretical modelling of a 
building based on observed displacements. The Guideline also suggests that the evaluation should be completed 
by a qualified structural engineer to determine repair and retrofit options. However, the Guideline provides no 
recommendation regarding the continuation or replacement of placards if Detailed Evaluation changes the damage 
status of a building.   
3 Implementation of Post-Earthquake Safety Assessment 
Nepal has had a relatively short history of managing post-disaster efforts in a coherent and systematic way. The 
legal framework for disaster management was put in place in 1982 with the promulgation of the Natural Calamity 
(Relief) Act (HMG, 1982). This act allocates responsibility of preparing for and responding to disasters to the 
government and provides an administrative structure for disaster management within the country. However, Nepal 
has no legislative framework for post-earthquake building safety evaluation. 
Following the 25 April 2017 earthquake, the GoN declared a state of emergency in 14 highly affected districts to 
facilitate earthquake response and requested assistance from the international community (MOHA, 2015). 
Immediately after the earthquake, the DUDBC, Nepal Engineers Association (NEA), National Society for 
Earthquake Technology-Nepal (NSET), and consulting companies mobilised volunteers or employees for Rapid 
Evaluation of buildings. The DUDBC and NSET, who are experts in the process, conducted assessments of large 
buildings, including hospitals and office buildings, and assigned them placards (Figure 5a and b). This exercise 
helped enable the immediate post-earthquake operation of these facilities. The Department of Education (DoE) 
also conducted Rapid Evaluation of school buildings in earthquake-affected areas and assigned placards to 
buildings when necessary (Figure 5c). Furthermore, many countries sent teams of engineers to support Rapid 
Evaluation of buildings in earthquake-affected areas. New Zealand sent a team of senior engineers who worked 
with DUDBC engineers to assist the GoN in performing Rapid Evaluation of institutional buildings (Figure 6a). 
Similarly, international non-governmental organisations and other professional bodies sent teams to support Rapid 
Evaluation (Figure 6b). Parallel to DUDBC’s assessment process, many owners of large private buildings such as 
apartment buildings hired structural engineers to carry out Rapid Evaluations.  
   
(a) Placarding by DUDBC of a 
hospital building in Kathmandu 
(b) Placarding by DUDBC of an 
apartment building in Kathmandu 
(a) A school building in a rural 
area placarded by the DoE as 
Unsafe  
Figure 5: Post-earthquake Rapid Evaluation and Placarding 
Following the 25 April 2015 earthquake, thousands of engineers arrived at NEA to provide volunteer support for 
the post-earthquake response. The NEA mobilised these volunteers to undertake Rapid Evaluations of residential 
buildings, initially in the Kathmandu Valley and later in other earthquake-affected areas. The response teams 
comprised two to three volunteer engineers (Figure 6c). The NEA established a call centre that enabled citizens 
in need of engineering services to call the organisation and request the services of an evaluation team for Rapid 
Evaluation of small residential and business buildings to determine their status. However, NEA did not placard 
houses, regardless of whether they were damaged or undamaged. Instead volunteer response teams worked as 
counsellors to home owners and completed Rapid Evaluation Safety Assessment Forms for inspected houses. 
 
   
(a) A team comprised of Nepalese 
and New Zealand engineers and 
hospital management in 
Kathmandu 
(b) An international team 
undertaking a Rapid Evaluation 
(EERI) 
(c) NEA response team 
Figure 6: Post-earthquake Rapid Evaluation teams 
4 Observations and Lessons 
4.1 Effectiveness of Rapid Visual Assessment  
The effectiveness of Rapid Evaluation of buildings was found to vary significantly depending on the individuals 
carrying out an assessment. During the Rapid Evaluation process, a significant level of knee-jerk reaction was 
observed among assessors, and, in many cases, assessors took an extremely conservative approach without 
considering the consequences of their decisions or advice. Following the Guideline, engineers suggested the 
demolition of buildings deemed “Unsafe” (with a red placard). This decision created panic among property owners 
because of the potential financial consequences.  
Overall, Rapid Evaluation was found to be a useful tool for enabling the continued use of lifeline buildings such 
as hospitals, communications, water supply facilities, and institutional buildings, and for allowing people to return 
to their homes. When evaluations were carried out by people well-versed in the process, the results were generally 
found to be satisfactory. While evaluations were largely found to be adequate for assessing the extent of damage 
to smaller buildings, entry to larger buildings was required to inspect damage not observable from the outside. 
4.2 Training in Rapid Visual Assessment 
After preparation of the Guideline document, relatively few Nepali engineers and building officials were trained 
in the post-earthquake evaluation of buildings. In contrast, engineers from DUDBC and NSET were generally 
well-versed in Rapid Evaluation of damaged buildings. Initially, NEA provided brief training sessions to volunteer 
engineers to complement their skills before they began conducting building evaluations (Figure 7). However, the 
evaluations were found to be extremely conservative and inconsistent in many instances because “safety” was 
considered paramount, leading to knee-jerk reactions in some cases that caused trauma to many building owners. 
The results of building evaluations revealed that many engineers lacked forensic skills, good engineering 
judgment, and the experience required for evaluation of damaged buildings. Following this experience, NEA 
provided more extensive trainings on Rapid Evaluation to volunteer engineers. The training sessions provided by 
NEA helped improve the quality of evaluations. This experience shows that in-depth training to engineers and 
building officials can be helpful for obtaining satisfactory results of the Rapid Evaluation process. Briefing 
sessions at the beginning and end of the days were organised to discuss and resolve issues arisen during the day.  
 
  
(a) Classroom training  (b) Field training 
Figure 7: Training sessions on Rapid Evaluation following the earthquakes 
As identified by Galloway et al. (Galloway, et al., 2014), it is important to convey to assessors the difficult balance 
that must be struck in the emergency management of buildings. While there is a need to clearly identify buildings 
suitable for occupation and economic continuity, it is also important for assessors to communicate the inherent 
risk associated with earthquakes to building owners. 
4.3 Public Understanding and Communication of Risk 
The earthquake sequence and resulting deaths and injuries, and damage and destruction of buildings, deeply 
affected the population in earthquake-affected areas and caused significant psychological and financial trauma. 
Buildings deemed “Unsafe” (with a red placard) were interpreted as buildings meant for demolition. Engineers 
relying on the Guideline played a significant role in this interpretation. In some cases, this message was spread by 
the media to the public.  
There were significant rumours regarding the recurrence of earthquakes. This development further traumatised 
the already shaken population. Clairvoyants played a major role in spreading these rumours. Some blame can also 
be attributed to the scientific community as they provided unclear and inconsistent messaging. The media also 
played a significant role in informing communities about rumours. Immediately after the earthquake, many 
television stations broadcasted news related to the earthquake from dawn to dusk. Within the limitations of their 
technical understanding, the media made considerable efforts to communicate essential information to people 
regarding their response to the earthquake. However, the limited technical capability of media personnel resulted 
in the dissemination of unclear and inconsistent public safety messages in many cases.  
Similar to the Canterbury earthquake sequence, the word ‘safe’ was commonly used to indicate that a building 
was suitable to reoccupy. However, in building safety evaluation terms, “safe” is intended to convey presence of 
a relative risk no greater than prior to the earthquake (Galloway, et al., 2014). Accordingly, it was extremely 
difficult to sell the concept that there is no such thing as an absolutely safe building to many of the Nepali 
engineers.  
4.4 Barricading and Occupation of Damaged Buildings 
A red placard in earthquake-affected areas did not imply a building could not be occupied until reassessed and red 
placard removed, as the legal system in Nepal does not prevent occupancy of these buildings. People often 
occupied or worked around buildings deemed “Unsafe” (Figure 8), regardless of whether these buildings were 
placarded or not. Furthermore, the barricading of severely damaged or collapsed building was not followed as a 
norm (Figure 9), because of logistical reasons, because it was deemed unnecessary, or because this action was not 
possible in many cases. As evidenced during the Canterbury earthquake sequence and subsequent earthquakes, 
this scenario would be totally unacceptable in New Zealand. 
Undoubtedly, occupation of earthquake-damaged buildings should be based on the significance of the damage 
sustained and the risk posed by this damage. However, it should be appreciated that when options for alternatives 
are limited, people are sometimes forced to occupy damaged buildings, regardless of the risk posed. This scenario 
was true in Nepal, and the situation was further complicated by a lack of security of personal property. Hence, 
many people erected tents near their damaged houses to safeguard their property despite the risk posed by the 
nearby damaged building.  
 
It should be noted that occupation of damaged buildings also depends on how risk is perceived by an individual 
or community. Culture, religion, race, ethnicity, faith, literacy, gender, education, and experience influence a 
person’s or a community’s interpretation and perception of risk (Okazaki, Ilki, Ahmad, Kandel, & Rahayu, 2008). 
With a change in scenario (i.e., experiencing an earthquake) or with increased affordability and better education, 
peoples’ risk perception changes. However, once people begin to believe that there is little they can do to protect 
themselves, they slide into surrender and fatalism (Bothara & Sharpe, 2009). This scenario was observed in many 
cases in earthquake-affected areas of Nepal, particularly those with extensive destruction.   
 
   
(a) Children playing in the debris of 
destroyed buildings 
(b) Occupied buildings in 
Kathmandu with 1% tilt and 
severely damaged columns 
(c) An occupied residential 
building (deemed “unsafe”) 
   
(d) School building with collapsed 
walls. The building was used for 
post-earthquake accomodation 
(e) People charging cell phones 
in an “unsafe” school building 
that housed operational solar 
panels  
(f) Occupied school building 
placarded as “unsafe”’ 
Figure 8: Occupancy of damaged buildings 
 
   
(a) Barricaded damaged 
building 
(b) Tilting building with no barricade 
along one of the main transport 
corridors in Kathmandu  
(c) Severely destroyed area with 
unrestricted access 
Figure 9: Absence of barricades around damaged buildings 
5 Lessons Learned 
During the post-earthquake, Rapid Evaluation of buildings several gaps in the process were found that require 
improvements. If improvements can be incorporated into the process, then the evaluations can become more 




• The 2015 Nepal earthquake essentially affected rural areas (Bothara, Dhakal, Dizhur, & Ingham, 2016). 
Kathmandu is the seat of government, academic institutions, and international agencies and although 
affected, the city mainly escaped the wrath of the disaster and the machinery necessary for earthquake 
response remained intact. This outcome may not be the case during future earthquakes and hence a back-
up system needs to be developed.  
 
• Self-sufficiency of the deployed Building Evaluation teams is an important issue for their efficiency and 
operational capability. A lack of self-sufficiency from a team can hinder response and recovery efforts. 
 
• Although it is unacceptable to dilute building classification criteria, it is not sensible to enforce something 
that cannot be implemented in a given socioeconomic and cultural environment. Building classification 
criteria could be risk based wherein high-risk buildings (e.g., important, high-occupancy buildings and 
those along major transport corridors) could be evaluated against more rigorous criteria compared to low-
risk buildings (e.g., small houses, buildings not along transport corridors). The concept of incremental 
safety could be useful in this context. 
 
• The Guideline needs immediate amendment and updating due to the following reasons: 
o The purpose of the Guideline is unclear. While the Guideline states that its purpose is to provide 
criteria and guidance for damage assessment, there appears to be a disconnect between damage 
and “safety” in the evaluation of buildings; 
o The Guideline recommends demolition of “unsafe” (red placarded) buildings, which is 
misleading. This interpretation traumatised people who owned buildings that were standing but 
were marked for demolition; 
o The current classifications (i.e., Inspected, Limited Entry, and Unsafe) should be further divided 
into sub-classifications. A field guide developed by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment (MBIE, 2014) could be useful in this context; 
o The scope and purpose of the Detailed Evaluation and Detailed Quantitative Analysis processes 
are unclear in the Guidelines and need to be clarified; 
o Subjecting all buildings to a full engineering evaluation as suggested by the Guideline does not 
make sense from a logistical and economic point of view although the intent may be good; 
o The current scope of the Guideline is limited to RC frame and loadbearing masonry (brick and 
stone) buildings. The guideline does not address other building typologies common in Nepal. A 
guideline developed for Bhutan (ATC, 2014) could be a good resource to consult for this 
purpose; 
o A few paragraphs in the Guideline are totally non-contextual and misleading and need to be 
removed; 
o The wording on the placards included in the Guideline needs amendment; 
o The Guideline mentions the term Windshield Evaluation, but provides no details on this process. 
A section on Windshield Evaluation could be added to the Guideline to suggest evaluation of 
essential facilities (i.e., hospitals, lifeline facilities, and police and fire stations) and community 
facilities (i.e., pharmacies, grocery stores, and hardware stores) on a priority basis. 
 
• Whether intended or not, assessors often serve as counsellors when they inspect buildings, particularly 
residential buildings. Hence, the assessors must have the skills necessary to speak accurately and 
respectfully and understand sensitivity of the time, place, and context (e.g., a house owner may have lost 
relatives and hence the sanctity of the place must be maintained in a religious context). Direct criticism 
should be avoided in any circumstance.  
 
• Clear communication to the public is critical to avoid confusion, rumour, and trauma during a disaster. 
The public and engineers need to be informed that buildings carry a level of inherent seismic risk and 
that they cannot be guaranteed to be earthquake-proof or safe. Suitable flyers could be prepared with 
clear messages and distributed during the building inspection process. The flyer could include clear 
messages about entering damaged buildings for retrieval of possessions, safety precautions, and general 
information on recovering from the disaster, including information about the building evaluation 
procedure and interpretation of its results.  
 
• In-depth training on the purpose and process of Rapid Evaluation, and interpretation of observations are 
essential for building assessors and the people managing them. Training should include communication 
skills. 
 
• In addition to training, a discussion forum during the building evaluation process and a review of a certain 
percentage of completed evaluations for quality control are important for consistent results. In addition 
to these initiatives, “flying” squads could be formed to cross-verify results on-site of a certain percentage 
of assessed buildings. Furthermore, a briefing and debriefing mechanism for the start and end of the day 
should be established. All the outcomes of discussions and cross-checks should be discussed with 
evaluation teams for the improvement of evaluations.  
 
• Evaluation teams should be composed based on team members’ competencies. Teams could be deployed 
considering the complexity of the building structures to be evaluated. For this change to happen, a 
database of assessors is essential. This approach would be particularly useful if the affected area is large. 
 
• A regular check-in with the Evaluation Command Centre every few hours, by phone call or text message, 
would provide a good safety check. This check-in can be used as an opportunity to provide a miniature 
progress report, if time allows (Marshall, et al., 2012).  
6 Conclusions 
Lessons learned from the post-earthquake Rapid Evaluation of buildings following the 2015 earthquake sequence 
in Nepal are outlined. These lessons relate to the context and effectiveness of Rapid Evaluations, the triage process 
of buildings, and training needs. Improvements were proposed pertaining to the current building safety assessment 
processes and an outline was presented of further considerations for reoccupation of damaged buildings in the 
context of Nepal. 
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